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IV

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction of this
matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S78-2a-3(2)(j).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Appellants

Hill

and

Caldwell

(hereinafter

collectively

referred to as H&C) listed several issues in their brief, but
did not cite the standard

for review as required by Rule

24(a)(5), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company
Farm)

submits

the

relevant

issues

on

Respondent State

(hereinafter State
appeal

with

their

appropriate standard of review, can be summarized as follows:
1.

Was the trial court's granting of summary judgment for

State Farm correct because:
a.

Hill was not in privity of contract with State

Farm, State Farm owed Hill no duty, and Hill, therefore, has no
claim for bad faith or punitive damages;
b.

There is no basis for punitive damages because

H&C alleged contractual, not tort, claims; and
c.

There was no first-party bad faith, as a matter

of law, because the subrogation issue was fairly debatable.
Standard of Review:

No genuine issue of material fact and

review trial court's legal conclusions for correctness.

Shire

Dev. v. Frontier Inv., 799 P.2d 221 (Utah App. 1990); Pixton v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
(Utah App. 1991).

1

P.2d

, 158 U.A.R. 31

2.

Did the trial court correctly deny H&C's motion to file

an amended complaint?
Standard of Review:

Abuse of discretion.

Regional Sales

Agency, Inc. v. Reichert, 784 P.2d 1210 (Utah App. 1989).
RULES WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE
1.

Rule 56, U.R.C.P.

2.

Rule 15, U.R.C.P.

Copies of these rules are attached as Addendum 1.
STATEMENT OF CASE
A.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition
in the Trial Court
This case was filed on November 18, 1983.

Appeal, hereinafter R., 2)
with State Farm.

(R. 2-3)

(Record on

Caldwell's automobile was insured
Caldwell's son, Troy, and Hill's

daughter, Tamara, were killed on June 6, 1982, when they were
involved in an accident while riding together in Caldwell's car.
The accident was with Kenneth Paul Bryan (hereinafter "Bryan"),
who was driving a vehicle insured by Cumis Insurance Society
(hereinafter "CUMIS").

(R. 2)

State Farm paid Caldwell $5,510 for property damage to his
vehicle under the collision coverage provision of Caldwell's
insurance policy.

(R. 174, Caldwell Depo., p. 11)

H&C made wrongful death claims against CUMIS.

CUMIS had a

$50,000 single limit liability policy covering Bryan.

(R. 4)

State Farm notified CUMIS of its $5,510 property damage
subrogation claim.

(See R. 343) When CUMIS settled with H&C,

2

it issued a separate draft for $5,510 payable to Caldwell and
State Farm, representing the property damage to Caldwell's car
and paid the remainder of its $50,000 equally to H&C.

(R. 174,

Caldwell Depo., pp. 22-23, 25-26, 31 and Depo. Exh. 1; R. 175,
Hill Depo., pp. 34-36)
H&C sued State Farm for the $5,510, claiming it rightfully
belonged to them and that State Farm acted in bad faith by
refusing to waive its subrogation claim.

(See R. 2-6)

State Farm answered and counterclaimed against Caldwell for
the $5,510.

(R. 9-12, 52-59)

Judge Billings, then a Third District Court Judge, granted
summary judgment on October 22, 1984, in favor of State Farm,
dismissing H&C's complaint and awarding State Farm a judgment
against Caldwell of $6,393.11. (R. 135-37) Judge Billings also
granted summary judgment in favor of Bryan on State Farm's
third-party complaint.

(IcL )

A copy of the Judgment is

attached hereto as Addendum 2.
H&C appealed Judge Billing's summary judgment to the Supreme
Court on November 19, 1984.

(R. 142) On November 1, 1988, the

Supreme Court issued its decision reversing State Farm's summary
judgment.

(R. 206-210) Hill v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,

765 P.2d 864 (Utah 1988). A copy of the decision is attached as
Addendum 3.
Following remittitur of the case, State Farm paid the $5,510
plus interest to Caldwell.

(R. 217, 347) State Farm moved for

summary judgment on May 4, 1989, on all Hill's claims and
3

partial summary judgment on Caldwell's punitive damage claim.
(R. 248-49)

H&C responded, in part, by filing a motion for

leave to file first amended complaint on June 16, 1989.

(R.

278-79)

Judge David S. Young denied the motion to amend.

(R.

319-21)

A copy of Judge Young's order is attached as Addendum

4.

Judge Young entered summary judgment for State Farm on all

Hill's claims and on Caldwell's punitive damage claim on March
26, 1990.

(R. 346-49)

A copy of the Judgment is attached as

Addendum 5.
On April 21, 1990, State Farm moved for summary judgment on
Caldwell's remaining claim for bad faith. (R. 354-55) Caldwell
filed no opposition to the motion. Judge Young entered judgment
for State Farm on June 11, 1990.

(R. 368-69)

A copy of the

Judgment is attached as Addendum 6.
In

the

judgment

entered

March

26, 1990, Judge

Young

specifically ordered, inter alia, that following State Farm's
payment of the $5,510 plus interest to Caldwell, the only
remaining claims were for bad faith and punitive damages; that
H&C's bad faith claims were first-party insurance contract bad
faith claims; that no punitive damages can be recovered for
first-party insurance bad faith claims; that H&C had alleged no
independent tortious conduct; and that the issues raised by
H&C's bad faith claims were and had been throughout the pendency
of the action fairly debatable.

(R. 347-48)

In the judgment

entered on June 11, 1990, Judge Young again found the issues
raised

by

Caldwell's

bad

faith
4

claim

were

and

had

been

throughout the pendency of the action fairly debatable.

(R.

368-69)
B.

Statement of Facts
In addition to the facts set forth above, the following

additional facts are relevant:
Caldwell's insurance policy with State Farm included a
subrogation provision applicable to collision coverage.

It

stated:
Subrogation. Upon payment under this policy, .
. . the company shall be subrogated to all the
insured's rights of recovery therefor and the
insured shall do whatever is necessary to
secure such rights and do nothing to prejudice
them. [R. 239]
Collision coverage under the policy was for Caldwell!s 1979
Honda 2-door automobile.

(R. 228, 233-36)

State Farm paid $6,5 39 in no-fault benefits for Caldwell and
$6,120 in no-fault benefits for Hill.

(R. 90-91) The no-fault

payments included $5,000 for Hill and $5,000 for Caldwell in
survivor benefits.

(R. 228, 232, 233)

State Farm waived any

claim for reimbursement of no-fault benefits more than one year
before H&C filed their complaint, which waiver was confirmed by
letter to CUMIS dated August 9, 1982.
letter is attached as Addendum 7.

(R. 343) A copy of this

Caldwell's prior attorney,

Mr. Haslam, was notified of this waiver before H&C!s subsequent
attorney, Mr. Lauchnor, was retained.

(R. 340-41)

In Hill v. State Farm, supra, the Supreme Court was required
"to determine who is entitled to the settlement proceeds." 765

5

P.2d at 867. In that regard, the court concluded there were two
issues of material

fact which precluded

summary judgment.

First, whether H&C were fully compensated for their wrongful
death claims without receiving the $5,510; and, second, whether
State

Farm's

subrogation

right

was

prejudiced

by

H&C's

settlement with, and release of, Bryan. The court further held
that if either of those issues were decided in favor of State
Farm, then State Farm was entitled to the $5,510.

There is

nothing in the court's opinion which even remotely suggests
State Farm acted in bad faith by asserting its subrogation
right.
H&C's brief contains several factual statements which State
Farm submits are either inaccurate, or merely a statement of
opinion.
For example, on numerous occasions, H&C assert as a fact
that CUMIS1 liability coverage was insufficient to cover the
wrongful death claims.
Contrary

(See Appellants' Brief at 10-11, 16)

to these assertions, the Supreme Court's opinion

specifically held this to be a disputed issue of fact.
H&C

also

assert

as

a

fact

that

State

Farm

sought

reimbursement of its no-fault benefits from CUMIS and that H&C
were required to hire counsel to stop State Farm from pursuing
this claim.

(See Appellants' Brief at 10)

In support of this

statement, H&C cite their own depositions (without reference to
any

specific

pages

therein)

and

also

the

affidavit

of

Mr. Lauchnor. Review of that affidavit shows Lauchnor first met
6

H&C on February 1, 1983 (R. 272), almost six months after State
Farm's

letter

to

reimbursement.

CUMIS

waiving

any

claim

for

no-fault

(R. 34 3) Lauchnor's affidavit contains several

hearsay statements attributable to CUMIS which would not be
admissible.

The affidavit refers to Lauchnor's conversations

with "State Farm's claims man" and "the claims manager for
CUMIS" without identifying either person by name.
H&C signed releases in favor of Bryan and others on March
16, 1983.

(R. 110-115)

Both Hill's and Caldwell's releases

specifically acknowledged there was a controversy concerning who
was entitled to the $5,510.
identified

(R. Ill, 113)

the $5,510 as payment

Caldwell's car.

The releases also

for property

damages to

(See R. 110-115)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

1.

There are no disputed issues of material fact, and State

Farm is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because:
a.

After remand of the case by the Supreme Court,

State Farm paid Caldwell the disputed subrogation moneys. The
only remaining issues thereafter were bad faith and punitive
damages, which could be decided as a matter of law.
b.

Hill's

and

Caldwell's

bad

faith

claims are

contractual first-party insurance bad faith claims.
c.

A first-party insurance bad faith claim can only

be made by a person in privity of contract with the insurance
company.

7

d.

There was no privity of contract between Hill and

State Farm with respect to State Farm's collision coverage
payment to Caldwell and the subrogation claim arising therefrom.
Therefore, State Farm owed Hill no duty, and Hill has no claim
for bad faith or punitive damages.
e.

No punitive damages can be awarded for H&C's

first-party bad faith claims because they are contract, not tort
claims.

H&C did not assert any independent tortious conduct

against State Farm.
f.

There is no first-party bad faith, as a matter of

law, because the issues concerning entitlement to the $5,510 and
State Farm's right to assert its subrogation claim are fairly
debatable.
2.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying

H&C's motion to amend complaint because it was made too late in
the

course

of

the

litigation

without

justification,

was

inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decision, asserted wholly
new claims, and was designed to create a punitive damages case
where none existed.
3.

H&C had more than adequate time to conduct discovery.

The summary judgment was not granted prematurely.

8

ARGUMENT
POINT L
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY GRANTED BECAUSE
THERE ARE NO DISPUTED GENUINE ISSUES OF
MATERIAL FACT AND STATE FARM IS ENTITLED TO
JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.
Summary judgment is properly granted where there are no
genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. Pixton v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co. ,
56, U.R.C.P.

P. 2d

, 158 U.A.R. 31 (Utah App. 1991); Rule

For the following reasons, the trial court was

correct in granting summary judgment in favor of State Farm.
A.

Hill Has No Cause of Action Because He Was Not In Privity
of Contract With State Farm, and State Farm Therefore Owed
Hill No Duty.
The $5,510 payment for which State Farm made a subrogation

claim was paid by State Farm to Caldwell for damage to his
Honda.

This was the payment of a first-party insurance claim.

State Farmfs policy with Caldwell gave State Farm the right to
"be subrogated to all [Caldwell's] rights of recovery" with
respect to the collision payment.

(R. 239)

Hill had no

ownership interest in the car and no claim for property damage
against Bryan.
Caldwell's rights.
the

Thus, State Farm was

subrogated

only to

CUMIS and Caldwell both recognized this in

release Caldwell signed

which stated

that a separate

settlement draft was being made payable to State Farm and
Caldwell for $5,510 representing property damage.

9

(R. 113)

Subrogation is "the substitution of another person in the
place of a creditor, so that the person in whose favor it is
exercised succeeds to the rights of the creditor in relation to
8 3 C.J.S. Subrogation §1.

the debt."

State Farm substituted

itself only in the place of Caldwell with respect to the
property damage payment because Caldwell was the "creditor" who
had a claim for property damage against Bryan.

This was

evidenced by the original judgment entered by Judge Billings for
$5,510 plus interest in favor of State Farm and solely against
Caldwell, not Hill.

(R. 135-37)

Hill was not an insured with respect to the collision
coverage of Caldwell's policy, nor the corresponding right of
subrogation arising therefrom.
H&C do not assert any bad faith with respect to State Farm's
investigation and payment of the collision claim. Instead, they
claim State Farm acted in bad faith after the collision claim
was paid by refusing to waive its subrogation right as part of
H&C's settlement with CUMIS. This is nonetheless a first-party
insurance bad faith claim because it arises out of the payment
of Caldwell's collision claim.
An analogous situation arose in AMICA Ins. Co. v. Schettler,
768 P.2d

950

(Utah App. 1989), in which Schettler claimed

AMICA's conduct after it paid Schettler's first-party claim
constituted bad faith. Schettler followed Beck v. Farmers Ins.
Exch.,

701

P.2d

795

(Utah

1985),

which

held

there

is a

contractual implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
10

applicable to first-party insurance claims.

Beck refused to

recognize a tort cause of action for bad faith in first-party
insurance claims.
Schettler held that "[i]n order to maintain an action under
a contractual theory of insurer bad faith, the parties must be
in privity of contract at the time of the alleged wrong. . . ."
768 P.2d at 957-58.
Hill must establish privity of contract with respect to the
collision coverage out of which State Farm's subrogation rights
arose in order to assert a first-party bad faith claim.
cannot do this.

Hill

There was no privity of contract between Hill

and State Farm with respect to the collision coverage.
That privity of contract is absolutely necessary to assert
a viable insurance bad faith claim was reiterated by the Utah
Court of Appeals in the recent case of Pixton v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., supra, filed on April 8, 1991.
Pixton was a State Farm insured who was injured in an
automobile accident with another State Farm insured, Davies.
State Farm paid

first-party no-fault benefits

Pixton sued Davies for personal injury.

for Pixton.

She also sued State

Farm, claiming, inter alia, State Farm breached its contract and
its duty of good faith and fair dealing by refusing to disclose
the amount State Farm paid to International Rehabilitation
Associates for its assistance in evaluating Pixton's medical
condition, and by using the same adjuster to handle both the
first and third-party claims.
11

Pixton settled her personal injury claim against Davies but
continued her suit against State Farm. The trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of State Farm, and the Court of
Appeals affirmed. It held State Farm owed no duty of good faith
to Pixton even though she was a first-party no-fault insured.
The court noted Pixton did not claim State Farm failed to
properly pay her first-party no-fault claim.
Relying on Beck, supra, Schettler, supra, and Ammerman v.
Farmer's Ins. Exch. , 19 Utah 2d 261, 430 P.2d 576 (1967), the
Court of Appeals stated:
Beck and AMICA specifically define the
duty of good faith and fair dealing as a
contractual duty running from the insurer to
its insured. In Ammerman, the supreme court
indicated that the duty of good faith and fair
dealing, even in third-party situations where
the insurer has a fiduciary duty to fairly
defend its insured, arose "because of the
policy," and was "regarded as a separate cause
of action for a wrong done to the insured by
violating a fiduciary duty owed to him." . . .
In the case before us, Pixton has no
relevant contractual relationship with State
Farm. Pixton makes no claim that State Farm
failed to perform any obligation under her nofault insurance policy with State Farm. . . .
[A]ll her first-party claims were settled to
her satisfaction. Thus, under Beck, State Farm
owes Pixton no duty as there is no relevant
contractual relationship. Neither is there a
duty under Ammerman as there is no fiduciary
relationship based on a covenant to defend.
[Emphasis added]
Pixton clearly shows State Farm owed Hill no duty of good
faith concerning the collision coverage issue because "there is
no relevant contractual relationship." Hill was not an insured
12

for collision coverage purposes. Where there is no privity of
contract, there is no duty.

Therefore, Hill has no claim for

bad faith against State Farm.
Hill's claim that he was in privity of contract with State
Farm because State Farm paid no-fault benefits is without merit.
Hill

has

not

claimed

State

Farm

acted

in

bad

faith

in

investigating and paying him over $6,000 in no-fault benefits.
Although Hill claims State Farm pursued a claim for no-fault
reimbursement, the facts do not support that (R. 34 3)
Even though paragraph 5 of the policy conditions clearly
gave State Farm the contractual right to seek such reimbursement
it waived

said

right.

(R. 239-40)

Assuming, therefore,

arguendo, State Farm did at some point assert a right of nofault reimbursement, its contract allowed it to do so, and Hill
v. State Farm, supra, recognized the equitable doctrine of
subrogation "can be modified by contract."

765 P.2d at 866.

Further, Utah's No-Fault Act specifically sanctions a no-fault
insurer's right of reimbursement from the tortfeasor's insurer.
Utah Code Ann. $31A-22-309(6),

formerly

U.C.A. $31-41-11.

Nonetheless, despite both the contractual right of subrogation
and the above-specified statutory provision, State Farm waived
its claim for no-fault reimbursement within approximately two
months after the accident.

Certainly there could be no bad

faith arising out of such conduct, even assuming State Farm
asserted its contractual and statutory right of reimbursement.

13

B.

There Is No Material Issue of Fact Concerning Entitlement to
the $5,510 or Concerning Whether the Releases Breached the
Insurance Contract.
H&C claim there are material issues of fact regarding State

Farm's right to subrogation and reimbursement from CUMIS and
concerning

whether

the

releases

H&C

signed

breached

the

insurance policy contract. H&C are mistaken. The Supreme Court
remanded the case for a determination of two fact issues,
namely, whether H&C were fully compensated and whether State
Farm's subrogation rights had been prejudiced.

The resolution

of these facts would result in a determination of who was
entitled to the disputed $5,510.
Since State Farm paid Caldwell the disputed money after
remand, those fact issues are no longer material to the case.
The trial court specifically recognized this in the March 26,
1990, Judgment, which stated the only remaining issues were bad
faith and punitive damages.
C.

(R. 346-49)

There Was No Bad Faith, as a Matter of Law, Because the
Subrogation Issue Was Fairly Debatable.
H&C also claim there are ma arial issues of fact concerning

whether

State

Farm

acted

in

bad

faith

by

asserting

its

subrogation right against CUMIS and whether State Farm has the
burden of proving its subrogation demand was accurate.
State Farm submits there are no disputed material facts on
these issues. State Farm notified CUMIS of its property damage
subrogation claim.

State Farm refused to waive that claim.

State Farm agreed to waive its claim for reimbursement of no-

14

fault benefits. It confirmed this by letter to CUMIS in August,
1982.

(R. 343)

In addition to State Farm's August, 1982 letter to CUMIS
waiving its right of no-fault reimbursement, the releases signed
by H&C clearly state that no money was withheld for no-fault
reimbursement. The only disputed amount was the $5,510 paid for
property damage.
H&Cfs bad faith claims are for first-party insurance bad
faith, which
Schettler,

are

and

contract, not
Pixton,

tort

supra.

claims.
Regardless

See Beck,
of

H&Cfs

characterization of their bad faith complaint (see Appellants1
Brief at 29), it is ultimately grounded upon H&C's allegation
that State Farm acted in bad faith by refusing to waive its
subrogation

right.

If

that

issue,

i.e.,

waiver

of the

subrogation claim, was fairly debatable, then there is no bad
faith, as a matter of law.

Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co.,

745 P.2d 838 (Utah App. 1987).

In Callioux, the court stated:

If the evidence presented creates a
factual issue as to the claim's validity, there
exists a debatable reason for denial, thereby
legitimizing the denial of the claim, and
eliminating the bad faith claim. "When a claim
is fairly debatable, the insurer is entitled to
debate it, whether the debate concerns a matter
of fact or law."
...
This general policy was explained by the Utah
Supreme Court in Western Cas. & Surety Co. v.
Marchant, 615 P.2d 423, 427 (Utah 1980):
It would not comport with our
ideas of either law or justice to
prevent any party who entertained
bona fide questions about his
15

legal obligations from seeking
adjudication
thereon
in the
courts•
745 P.2d at 842•

An insurance company cannot be found to

have acted in bad faith for debating either a factual or a legal
issue that is fairly debatable.
in Callioux, Progressive denied Callioux1 first-party fire
loss claim.

Callioux was charged criminally with arson and

subsequently acquitted.

Thereafter, Progressive paid the fire

claim, and Callioux sued for bad faith. The trial court granted
summary judgment for Progressive, and the Court of Appeals
affirmed, holding the claim was fairly debatable and there was
no bad faith, as a matter of law.
The same principle applies in the instant case.

The issue

of whether State Farm was required to waive its subrogation
claim is and has been throughout the pendency of this case,
fairly debatable.

(R. 368-69)

The history

of the case

establishes this.
For

example, Judge

Billings

agreed

with

State

Farm's

position and not only dismissed H&Cfs complaint in its entirety,
but also granted summary judgment against Caldwell.

Although

the Supreme Co rt reversed that decision, it was on the basis
that there were factual issues regarding entitlement to the
$5,510.

The Supreme Court did not hold State Farm was not

entitled to the disputed moneys.

Furthermore, the Supreme

Court's opinion did not give the slightest support to H&Cfs bad
faith claim. It would have been obviously contradictory for the
16

Supreme Court to indicate State Farm might still be entitled to
the money and at the same time suggest State Farm acted in bad
faith by asserting its right to the money.
The question of entitlement to the money
debatable issue, both factually and legally.

is a fairly

In its original

motion for summary judgment, State Farm relied upon Transamerica
Ins. Co. v. Barnes, 29 Utah 2d 101, 505 P.2d 783 (1972), for the
proposition that since Caldwell and Hill both identified the
$5,510 in their releases as payment made for property damages,
Caldwell was not entitled to double payment.
Billings agreed with this legal position.
held there were factual issues.

(R. 78-84) Judge
The Supreme Court

In either case, the issue is

fairly debatable.
H&C apparently recognize no issue regarding the value of
their wrongful death claims, arguing there is "uncontroverted,
unimpeached and unassailable" evidence that the death claims
were worth more than $50,000.

If the Supreme Court had so

found, it would not have identified value of the claims as a
factual issue on remand.
Further, H&C fail to recognize that CUMIS1 single limit
liability policy created a significant problem in this case.
The single limit was intended to cover both personal injury and
property

damage liabilities.

Liability

coverage

for both

personal injury and property damage is mandatory under Utah's
insurance code.

U.C.A. $$31A-22-302, 303, 304 and 41-12A-301.

See also, former U.C.A. 4^41-12-1, 21 and 31-41-4, 5; Allstate
17

Ins. Co. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty, 619 P.2d 329 (Utah 1980);
Dairyland Ins. Corp. v. Smith, 646 P.2d 737 (Utah 1982).
H&C's position regarding entitlement to settlement moneys
would result in the CUMIS policy providing no property damage
liability coverage in violation of the Utah Insurance Code.
Based on the foregoing, State Farm submits the subrogation
issue is and always has been fairly debatable, and, therefore,
there can be no first-party bad faith, as a matter of law.
POINT II,
EQUITABLE SUBROGATION PROVIDES NO BASIS FOR
HILL'S BAD FAITH CLAIM.
H&C assert the doctrine of equitable subrogation somehow
establishes a right in Hill to assert a bad faith claim.
Equitable subrogation has nothing to do with bad faith. It does
not arise out of contract.

Alleging a right of equitable

subrogation establishes even more clearly the absence of privity
of contract between State Farm and Hill.
The Utah Supreme Court has identified two types of bad faith
with respect to insurance companies, namely, third-party bad
faith which arises where the insurer is defending its insured
against a liability claim; and, first-party bad faith which
arises in the context of the payment by an insurer of a firstparty claim.

See Beck v. Farmer's Ins. Exch., supra.

instant case does not involve third-party bad faith.

The

The only

theory available to Hill is first-party bad faith. Such a claim
requires

privity

of

contract, Point

18

I.A.,

supra.

As a

consequence, the concept of equitable subrogation has absolutely
nothing to do with, and cannot be the basis for, a claim by Hill
for first-party bad faith.
POINT III,
PUNITIVE DAMAGES MAY NOT BE AWARDED IN FIRSTPARTY BAD FAITH CLAIMS.
H&C assert punitive damages may be awarded in a first-party
bad faith case.

They failed to cite Canyon Country Store v.

Bracey, 781 P.2d

414 (Utah 1989), where the Supreme Court

addressed that very issue.

Canyon Country Store involved a

first-party insurance claim for property damages. The insurance
companies refused to pay the claims. Canyon Country filed suit
for various types of damages, including punitive damages.
Canyon Country obtained a jury verdict for the property damages
claimed, for certain lost profits, and for attorney's fees, but
the jury did not award any punitive damages.

It is not clear

whether the trial court even submitted the punitive damages
issue to the jury.
On appeal, Canyon Country claimed the trial court erred by
refusing to allow Canyon Country to submit evidence regarding
the insurers1 wealth. The Supreme Court rejected that argument
and stated:
It is alleged that this information was crucial
in order to prove punitive damages. The amount
of a punitive damages award is not at issue in
this appeal, however.
Under Beck, punitive
damages are not available. Allegations of a
breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing owed first-party insurers and
their insured sound in contract, not in tort.
19

781 P.2d at 423.

Canyon Country Store makes it absolutely

clear that no punitive damages may be awarded in the instant
case on the basis of an alleged first-party bad faith claim.
In addition, there is no basis for a punitive damage award
because H&C alleged no independent tort against State Farm. H&C
argue that their original complaint asserted facts sufficient to
establish the tort of interference with economic relations.
This simply is not correct. The original complaint alleged that
H&C's wrongful death claims had a value which exceeded CUMIS1
policy limit, that State Farm was therefore not entitled to any
of the proceeds from the policy, and that State Farm acted in
bad faith by refusing to waive its subrogation claim.

The

prayer of the complaint asked for an award of "punitive damages
for bad faith in obstructing settlement of plaintiffs1 claim
against a tort feasor and causing unnecessary litigation. . . . "
Thus, H&C's claim for punitive damages was based upon their
theory that State Farm acted in bad faith, which, as already set
forth, is a first-party contractual bad faith claim for which no
punitive damages may be awarded.
The trial courtfs summary judgment dismissing all punitive
damage claims should be affirmed.
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POINT IV,
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY
DENYING H&C'S MOTION TO FILE AN AMENDED
COMPLAINT.
The motion for leave to amend was filed more than seven
years after the automobile accident and more than five and a
half years after the original complaint was filed.

(R. 2-3,

278) The proposed amended complaint contained allegations never
previously asserted, including intentional interference with
contract and economic relations.

In addition, totally new

damage claims were made, including claims for "physical, mental,
and emotional distress, anguish, pain and suffering; . . .
substantial disability and lost earning capacity . . ., impaired
. . . ability to mitigate and avert . . . loss of [Hill's]
family home . . .."

(See R. 280-87)

This case had already gone to the Supreme Court on the
initial

complaint,

allegations.

The

which
Supreme

contained
Court

none

remanded

of
the

the
case

above
for

determination of who was entitled to the $5,510.
Amendments after remand should not be allowed where they are
inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decision. See 6 Wright &
Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure ^1489. The allegations in
the proposed amended complaint were not consistent with the
Supreme Court's decision which was that State Farm could not
have summary judgment and receive the $5,510 because there were
disputed material issues of fact.
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H&C filed their motion to amend after State Farm filed its
motion for summary judgment in May of 1989. Since State Farm's
motion sought dismissal of all punitive damage claims because no
independent tort had been alleged, and because first-party bad
faith was not the basis for a punitive damage claim in Utah, H&C
obviously decided they needed to assert an independent tort.
This is not a justifiable reason to allow an amendment.
Allowing an amendment to pleadings "is discretionary with
the trial court" and will not be disturbed on appeal "absent an
abuse of discretion." Regional Sales Agency, Inc. v. Reichert,
784 P.2d

1210, 1216

(Utah App. 1989); see also, Rule 15,

U.R.C.P.
In Reichert, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
denial of defendant's motion to amend his counterclaim three
years after his original answer was filed, and on the day before
trial was scheduled to begin.

The court stated:

Appellate courts have upheld a trial
court's denial of a motion to amend where the
amendment is sought late in the course of the
litigation, where there
is no adequate
explanation or the delay, and where the movant
was aware of the facts underlying the proposed
amendment long before its filing.
784 P.2d at 1216. In the instant case, H&C attempted to inject
new claims and issues through their amended complaint. There is
no valid justification for this.

H&C simply tried to create a

punitive damage case where none existed.

The trial court did

not abuse its discretion when it denied the motion to amend.
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In addition, the proposed amended complaint fails to state
a cognizable independent tort cause of action.

Interference

with contract requires evidence of "conduct which 'intentionally
and improperly interferes with the performance of a contract
. . ..f"

Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293,

301 (Utah 1982).

The tort of intentional interference with

economic relations requires proof of intentional interference
"for an improper purpose or by improper means."

Id. at 304.

Even assuming H&C had a contract and/or economic relations
which could have been interfered with, H&C cannot establish any
improper interference, purpose, or means.

State Farm asserted

its subrogation claim, a fairly debatable issue, which State
Farm was clearly entitled to have determined by the court. See
Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co., supra.

Two district judges

and the Supreme Court have already considered the matter. None
of them have found that State Farm did not have a valid
subrogation claim.

Therefore, since the issue was fairly

debatable, it could not, as a matter of law, be the basis for
the tort of interference with contract or economic relations.
POINT V.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS NOT GRANTED PRE- MATURELY.
H&C argue State Farm acted unreasonably and made grief
stricken

parents

wait

years

and

(Appellants1 Brief at 17, 22-23)

years

for

their

$5,510.

At the same time, H&C argue

summary judgment was granted prematurely, and that they need "a
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reasonable time in which to conduct discovery."

(^d. at 31)

Such positions are inconsistent.
H&C had adequate time to conduct discovery.

The Supreme

Court issued its Remittitur to the trial court on December 1,
1988.

(R. 205) Copy attached as Addendum 8.

State Farm filed

its motion for summary judgment and partial summary judgment on
May 5, 1989.

(R. 248-49)

H&C conducted no discovery between

those two dates. In fact, between the date of Remittitur (12-188) and the date of the trial court's final judgment (6-11-90),
H&C

served

one

set

of

interrogatories

and

requests

for

production of documents, to which State Farm responded on August
1, 1989.

(R. 301-304) H&C have had sufficient time to conduct

discovery.
H&C also argue State Farm presented no new facts after
Remittitur to support its summary judgment motions.
inaccurate.

This is

After Remittitur, State Farm paid Caldwell the

disputed money. This narrowed the remaining issues to those of
bad faith and punitive damages which could be decided as a
matter of law. Furthermore A case law developed after H&C filed
their first appeal helped to resolve those remaining issues, as
a matter of law. See Beck v. Farmer's Ins. Exch. , supra; AMICA
Ins.«J£o. v. Schettler, supra; Pixton v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co. , supra; Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co., supra; Canyon
Country Store v. Bracey, supra.
The summary judgment was properly granted
premature.
24

and was not

CONCLUSION
Summary judgment was proper in this case and should be
affirmed for the following reasons:
1.

Hill and State Farm were not in privity of contract,

State Farm owed Hill no duty, and therefore Hill has no claim
for bad faith or punitive damages.
2.

Hill's and Caldwell's bad faith claims are claims for

first-party insurance bad faith, which are contract, not tort
claims, and no punitive damages may be awarded for such bad
faith claims.
3.

There is no basis for a punitive damage claim because

there is no claim of independent tortious conduct by State Farm.
4.

There is no bad faith, as a matter of law, because the

subrogation issue is, and always has been, fairly debatable.
5.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying

Hill's and Caldwell's motion to amend.
6.

Summary judgment was not premature because Hill and

Caldwell had a reasonable time to conduct discovery.
Respectfully submitted this
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day of May, 1991.
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ADDENDUM 1

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 56

Rule 56. Summary judgment.
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any
part thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time,
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his
favor as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show t h a t there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and t h a t the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a
genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) C a s e not fully adjudicated on m o t i o n . If on motion under this rule
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories,
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits
of a party opposing the motion t h a t he cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such
other order as is just.

(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of
the court at any time t h d any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule
are presented in bad faun or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.

Rule 15. Amended and supplemental pleadings,
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of
course at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is
one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been
placed upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days
after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of
court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely
given when justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended
pleading within the time remaining for response to the original pleading or
within 10 days after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may
be the longer, unless the court otherwise orders.
(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence. When issues not raised by
the pleading are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall
be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such
amendments of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to
the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party
at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the
result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the
ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may
allow the pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the merits of the
action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the
court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining
his action or defense upon the merits. The court shall grant a continuance, if
necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence.
(c) Relation back of amendments. Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the
amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading.
(d) Supplemental pleadings. Upon motion of a party the court may, upon
reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a
supplemental pleading setting forth transactions or occurrences or events
which have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. Permission may be granted even though the original pleading is
defective in its statement of a claim for relief or defense. If the court deems it
advisable that the adverse party plead to the supplemental pleading, it shall
so order, specifying the time therefor.
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GLENN C. HANNI, A1327
R. SCOTT WILLIAMS, 34 98
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendant and
Third-Party Plaintiff
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake Cityf Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT KENT HILL, individually and as personal
representative of the heirs
Of TAMARA ELAINE HILL,
deceased, and LORIN DEAN
CALDWELL, individually and
as personal representative
of the heirs of TROY
NEIL CALDWELL, deceased,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
J U D G M E N T
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant.
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Third-Party
Plaintiff,
vs,
KENNETH PAUL BRYAN,
Third-Party
Defendant.

Civil No. C83-8099
Honorable Judith M. Billinqs

On September 28, 1984, this matter came on for hearing
before the Honorable Judith M. Billings, one of the judges of
the above-entitled court, on motion for summary judgment of
defendant State Farm, and on motion for summary judgment of
third-party defendant Kenneth Paul Bryan.

Plaintiffs were

represented by their attorney, Wallace R. Lauchnor.

Defendant

State Farm was represented by its attorney, Glenn C. Hanni of
the firm of Strong & Hanni.

Third-party defendant was represented

by his attorney, Heinz J. Mahler of the firm of Kipp and Christian.
It was stipulated by plaintiffs and defendant State Farm
that a copy of the depositions that have been taken in this case
could be used with the same force and effect as the original.
The court having heard arguments of counsel and being
fully advised,
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

State Farm's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby

granted and judgment is hereby entered on plaintiffs1 complaint
in favor of defendant State Farm and against plaintiffs and all
of them, no cause of action.
2.

Defendant State Farm's Motion for Summary Judgment

on its counterclaim against plaintiffs is hereby granted and
judgment is hereby entered in favor of State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company and against plaintiff, Lorin Dean
Caldwell, for the sum of $5510.00 with interest on said sum at
the rate of 10% per annum from March 16, 1983, being the date
that Cumis Insurance Society, Inc. delivered its check to plaintiff,

-2-

Lorin Dean Caldwell, which said check was payable to defendant
State Farm and Lorin Dean Caldwell, to the date hereof, making
a total judgment in favor of State Farm and against plaintiff,
Lorin Dean Caldwell of Six Thousand Three Hundred Ninety Three
and 11/100 Dollars ($6,393.11) together with costs in the amount
of $

.

This judgment shall bear interest at the rate

of 12% per annum from the date hereof until paid.
3.

Plaintiff, Lorin Dean Caldwell, shall forthwith

endorse said Cumis Insurance Society, Inc. check and shall
deliver the same to counsel for defendant State Farm.
4.

The motion of third-party defendant, Kenneth Paul

Bryan, for summary judgment is hereby granted and judgment is
hereby entered in favor of Kenneth Paul Bryan and against State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company on the third-party
complaint, no cause of action.
Dated this

$$'/uf day of October, 1984.
BY THE COURT:
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Robert Kent HILL, individually and as
Personal Representative of the heirs of
Tamara Elaine Hill, deceased, and Lorin Dean Caldwell, individually and as
personal representative of the heirs of
Troy Neil Caldwell, deceased, Plaintiffs
and Appellants,
v.
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant,
Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellee and
Cross-Appellant,
v.
Kenneth Paul BRYAN, Third-Party
Defendant and Cross-Appellee.
Nos. 20335, 20391.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Nov. 1, 1988.
Subsequent to settlement of wrongful
death action, personal representatives of
persons killed in accident filed suit against
automobile insurer. Insurer filed third-party claim against driver of second automobile. The District Court, Salt Lake County,
Judith M. Billings, J., granted summary
judgment for automobile insurer on issue
of subrogation and denied insurer's summary judgment motion against driver of
second automobile. Personal representatives and insurer appealed. The Supreme
Court, Durham, J., held that: (1) in determining allocation of amount received by
insured from third-party tort-feasor for
subrogation purposes, it is not assumed
that the amount of the settlement is coextensive with the amount of damages incurred; (2) in absence of specific contractual terms in either the release and settlement or the insurance policy, the insured
must be made whole prior to any recovery
by insurer against the tort-feasor; and (3)
where personal representatives released
driver of second automobile from further
liability in order to obtain settlement, insurer's only recourse was to show either that
the personal representatives were fully
compensated or that personal representa-

tives' action in releasing second driver
breached .the insurance policy.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part.
See also 709 P.2d 257.
1. Appeal and Error <3=»934(1)
In reviewing grant of motion for summary judgment, all doubts or uncertainties
concerning issues of fact are viewed in
light most favorable to party opposing
summary judgment.
2. Subrogation <3=>1
Subrogation is equitable doctrine and
is governed by equitable principles.
3. .Insurance <S=>601
In absence of express terms to the
contrary, insured must be made whole before the insurer is entitled to be reimbursed from a recovery from the third-partv tort-feasor.
4. Insurance e=»606(l)
Where court record did not reveal extent of subrogation terms of automobile
policy and it was not possible to ascertain
intent of parties as to extent of their respective rights under the subrogation
clause, the doctrine of subrogation would
be applied according to general principles
of equity.
5. Insurance <3=>606(10)
Where personal representatives of motorists killed in accident released driver of
second automobile from further liability in
order to obtain settlement with insurer of
second automobile, they were not entitled
to' receive future compensation from driver
of second automobile; thus, insurer of first
automobile could only be reimbursed from
personal representatives of persons killed
in the accident and had no claim on driver
of second automobile.
6. Insurance @»601
In determining allocation of amount
received by insured from third-party tortfeasor in order to determine insurer's right
to subrogation, it is not assumed that the
amount of the settlement is coextensive
with the amount of damages incurred.

HILL v. STATE FARM MUT. AUTO. INS. CO.
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7. Judgment <3=>181(23)
Where amount of damages suffered by
insured was disputed by insured and insurer, summary judgment on automobile insurer's subrogation ckum was not appropriate.
8, Insurance <3=>601
If plaintiffs' action in releasing tortfeasor breaches insurance policy and insurer can show it could have recovered from
tort-feasor, it will be entitled to proceeds as
a matter of equity.
Wallace R. Lauchnor, Salt Lake City, for
Robert Kent Hill and Lorin Dean Caldwell.
Glenn C. Hanni, R. Scott Williams, Salt
Lake City, for State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co.
J. Anthony Eyre, Heinz J. Mahler, Salt
Lake City, for Kenneth Paul Bryan.
DURHAM, Justice:
Plaintiffs appeal the trial court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of defendant,
arguing that numerous triable issues of
fact exist and claiming bad faith. State
Farm appeals from a judgment in favor of
third-party defendant Bryan. We reverse
the judgment against plaintiffs and affirm
the judgment against State Farm.
On June 6, 1982, an automobile owned
and driven by Kenneth Paul Bryan, who
was legally intoxicated, ran a red light and
struck a vehicle owned by plaintiff Lorin
Caldwell and driven by Caldwell's son.
Plaintiff Robert Hill's daughter was an occupant in Caldwell's vehicle. The force of
the impact was fatal to both Caldwell's son
and Hill's daughter. At the time of the
accident, Caldwell's vehicle was insured by
State Farm; Bryan's vehicle was insured
by Cumis Insurance International. State
Farm paid $5,510 to Caldwell for property
damage to his vehicle. Shortly thereafter,
Cumis offered to tender the policy limits of
$50,000 on Bryan's policy to plaintiffs in an
attempt to satisfy plaintiffs' claims. State
1. To arrive at these figures, the parties subtracted the property damage amount from the total
policy proceeds and divided the remainder
equally between them. The disputed property
765 P.2d—20

Farm thereupon notified Cumis of its subrogation claim for the amount it had paid
Caldwell for property damage.
Both plaintiffs contacted attorneys, who
filed separate suits against Bryan and independently investigated the extent of his
financial holdings. These investigations revealed that, aside from the Cumis policy,
Bryan was insolvent. After this discovery,
Caldwell and Hill withdrew their suits
against Bryan and made a claim with Cumis for the policy proceeds, which were to
be divided evenly between them. Cumis
refused to simply deliver one-half to each
plaintiff because of State Farm's subrogation claim. Plaintiffs therefore sought a
waiver of claim from State Farm, arguing
that the value of their wrongful death actions far exceeded Bryan's policy limits.
State Farm refused to waive its subrogation claim and apparently urged plaintiffs
to litigate their suits against Bryan so that
the amount of their damages could be judicially ascertained. Plaintiffs determined
the cost of acquiring such a judicial determination to be prohibitive.
Plaintiffs signed separate releases of
claims in favor of Bryan, Cumis, and other
possible defendants. In return, Cumis tendered $22,245 to Hill and $27,755 to Caldwell.1
Because Cumis refused to proffer policy
proceeds unless State Farm's subrogation
interest was accounted for, its tender to
Caldwell consisted of a check for $22,245
made to Caldwell alone and a check for
$5,510 made jointly to Caldwell and State
Farm. The latter draft corresponded to
the amount of property damage incurred
by Caldwell and accounted for State
Farm's subrogation claim. The release
signed by Caldwell recognized the dispute
surrounding the $5,510 by stating:
[A] controversy exists between State
Farm Mutual Insurance Company and
Lorin D. Caldwell as to who is entitled to
the said amount, and that the matter will
be resolved between the two or by paydamage award was then added to Caldwell's
portion because he was the owner of the damaged automobile.
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ment into court or by judicial determination.
Plaintiffs and State Farm failed to reach
an accord for more than one year after the
release was signed. Plaintiffs filed suit
against State Farm, seeking payment of
$5,510 and alleging bad faith on behalf of
State Farm for its refusal to waive the
subrogation claim. In turn, State Farm
filed a third-party claim against Bryan for
subrogation and indemnity. State Farm
also counterclaimed against plaintiffs for
$5,510.
State Farm filed a motion for summary
judgment on both plaintiffs' complaints and
on its own counterclaim. The trial court
granted the motion, awarding State Farm
$5,510, interest, and attorney fees. The
court also decreed that State Farm had no
cause of action against Bryan.
[1] In reviewing a grant of a motion for
summary judgment, all doubts or uncertainties concerning issues of fact are
viewed in the light most favorable to the
party opposing summary judgment.
Mountain States Tel. & Tel Co. v. Atkin,
Wright & Miles, 681 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Utah
1984). Where a triable issue of fact exists,
the cause will be remanded for determination of that issue.
Defendant State Farm asserts that it is
subrogated to the rights of plaintiffs and
that State Farm should thereby recover the
amount it paitf for property damage from
the amount plaintiffs recovered from the
third-party tort-feasor. Plaintiffs argue
that State Farm's subrogation rights do
not arise until plaintiffs have been made
whole.
[2,3] Subrogation is an equitable doctrine and is governed by equitable principles. This doctrine can be modified by
contract, but in the absence of express
terms to the contrary, the insured must be
made whole before the insurer is entitled to
be reimbursed from a recovery from the
third-party tort-feasor. Lyon v. Hartford
Accident & Indem. Co., 25 Utah 2d 311,
318, 480 P.2d 739, 744 (1971). Noncontractual subrogation rights will only be enforced on behalf of a party maintaining a

superior equitable position, and the insurer's equitable position cannot be superior to
the insured's unless the insured has been
completely compensated. Transamerica
Ins. Co. v. Barnes, 29 Utah 2d 101, 505
P.2d 783 (1972); see also Culver v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 221 N.J. Super. 493,
535 A.2d 15 (1987); Westendorfv. Stassori,
330 N.W.2d 699 (Minn.1983).
When the amount of damages incurred
by the insured has been judicially ascertained, the extent of the subrogation right
of the insurer is usually undisputed. The
insured is not entitled to double recovery,
arid the insurer is equitably entitled to recover any amounts from the insured that
the insured recovered from the tort-feasor.
When the insured settles with the tortfeasor before the amount of damages has
been judicially determined, it is more difficult to ascertain whether the insurer is
entitled to recover all or any of the amount
paid on the policy to the insured. See
generally Comment, Subrogation in
Pennsylvania—Competing Interests of
Insurers and Insureds in Settlements
with Third-Party Tort Feasors, 56 Temp.
L.Q. 667 (1983).
In Transamerica Insurance Co. v.
Barnes, 29 Utah 2d 101, 505 P.2d 783
(1972), this Court examined an insurance
company's claim for subrogation against its
insured where the insured had settled with
a third-party tort-feasor. The insurance
company asserted that the settlement covered the insured's entire claim and that the
insurance company was therefore entitled
to receive reimbursement for the medical
expenses it had paid the insured. In revising the summary judgment, this Court noted that a lump-sum settlement without apportionment as to specific items of damage
is not sufficient to indicate whether the
insured had received double compensation
for the same injury. Id. 29 Utah 2d at 106,
505 P.2d at 786. In order to ascertain what
the .settlement in Barnes was intended to
cover, this Court reversed and remanded
the cause for a trial. Id. 29 Utah 2d at 107,
505 ?.2d at 787.
Setting forth the purpose and intended
allocation of money given in the settlement
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is a simple matter. As this Court noted in
Barnes, to the extent a negotiated settlement was intended to include damages previously paid to the insured by the insurer,
the tort-feasor who is aware of the insurer's subrogation claim should offer payment in two drafts: one draft for the insured alone and a separate draft issued to
the insured and the insurer jointly. Id. 29
Utah 2d at 106, 505 P.2d at 787. In so
doing, the apportionment of the settlement
amount is clearly shown and the intentions
of the parties can most effectively be enforced.
[4] In the case now before the Court,
the insurer's right to subrogation was set
forth in the insurance policy. Unfortunately, the record does not reveal the extent of
the subrogation terms, nor does it provide
a complete copy of the insurance policy.
We are thus unable to ascertain the intent
of the parties as to the extent of their
respective rights under the subrogation
clause. Therefore, the doctrine of subrogation should be applied in this case according to general principles of equity.
As suggested in Barnes, Cumis prepared
two separate drafts when tendering payment to Caldwell under the settlement.
The first draft was to Caldwell alone and
the second draft, in the amount of $5,510,
was made to Caldwell and State Farm.
State Farm now argues that the joint draft
was intended by plaintiffs and Bryan to
cover plaintiffs' property damage. This
contention is incorrect. The language of
the release does not provide for the allocation of the $5,510. The release states that
the parties have yet to determine the rightful owner of that amount because "a controversy exists" between State Farm and
Caldwell "as to who was entitled to the
said amount, and that the matter will be
resolved between the two or by payment
into court or by judicial determination." In
other words, at the time the draft was
conveyed to State Farm and Caldwell, the
parties had not agreed whether that
amount was intended for property damage
or to satisfy the wrongful death claim.
Cumis acted properly in acknowledging
State Farm's subrogation claim and in be-

ing certain that, to the extent State Farm
was justified in taking reimbursement from
Cumis's policy limits, it would be able to do
so. Nonetheless, the plain language of the
release shows that neither Cumis nor plaintiffs intended the amount to be allocated to
property damage without further negotiation.
[5] Because the parties have been unable to resolve the subrogation question,
we are required to determine who is entitled to the settlement proceeds. State
Farm argues that the amount recovered by
plaintiffs from Cumis represents the entire
amount of plaintiffs' damages. Plaintiffs,
on the other hand, argue that the amount
received from Cumis only compensates
them for a portion of their damages and
therefore they are not obligated to reimburse State Farm until they receive a full
recovery. Since plaintiffs released Bryan
from further liability in order to obtain the
settlement with Cumis, they are not entitled to receive future compensation from
Bryan. Thus, State Farm can only be reimbursed from plaintiffs and has no claim on
Biiyan. See 73 Am. Jur.2d Subrogation
§ 106 (subrogee's rights are subject to limitations placed on the rights of subrogor).
[6] In determining the allocation of an
amount received by an insured from a
third-party tort-feasor, we do not assume
that the amount of the settlement is coextensive with the amount of damages incurred. Damages encompass the injuries
suffered by a plaintiff. The amount of a
settlement almost universally reflects the
greatest amount that a plaintiff could have
possibly received from a tort-feasor without litigation. As the court in Janzen v.
Land O'Lakes, Inc., 278 N.W.2d 67 (Minn.
1979), stated:
fMJany considerations enter into settlements. Respondent may have wished to
avoid possibly protracted and frustrating
legal battles; respondent may have needed the money immediately; or respondent may have been pressured into the
'agreement for other reasons. Thus, the
amount of the settlement and compensation may not adequately reflect the actual loss
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Id. at 70; see also Cooper v. Younkin, 339
N.W.2d 552, 554 (Minn.1983); Florida
Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Martin, 377
So.2d 827, 830-31 (Fla.1979).
One of the considerations which may lead
an insured to settle with a third-party tortfeasor for an amount less than its damages
is that the tort-feasor is insolvent and less
than adequately insured. Here, Bryan was
personally insolvent, and his insurance policy was for an amount apparently insufficient to cover the full extent of plaintiffs'
claims.2
Several courts have noted the importance
of a tort-feasor's solvency or adequacy of
insurance in influencing the insured's decision to settle and will not allow an insurer
to exercise a subrogation claim where the
settlement was reached due to the tort-feasor's inability to fully compensate the insured. See, e.g., Government Employees
Ins. Co. v. Graff, 327 So.2d 88, 91 (Fla.
1976); Cooper, 339 N.W.2d at 554.

doctrine of subrogation. See, e.g., Automobile Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Conlon, 153
Conn. 415, 216 A.2d 828 (1966); Dimick ex
rel. Dimick v. Lewis, 127 N.H. 141, 497
A.2d 1221 (1985).
[7] In the instant case, the amount of
plaintiffs' damages is a question of fact
which has yet to be determined. There is
no specific contractual language in the insurance policy which requires allocation of
the settlement amount, nor does the release specify who should receive the $5,510
paid jointly to State Farm and Caldwell.
Because the amount of plaintiffs' damages
is disputed by the parties, that amount
should be set through judicial determination so that the proceeds from Bryan's
policy can be equitably distributed. That
judicial determination will be factually
based, and therefore summary judgment
was inappropriate in this case.

Our holding does not undermine the suggestion in Barnes that a settlement agreement can effectively allocate the damages
it is intended to cover through the use of
multiple drafts made out to appropriate
parties. Instead, where the language of
the release leaves the allocation uncertain
and where there is no controlling contractual language to the contrary, the insured
should be given the benefit of the doubt as
to its damages and the burden will rest
with the insurer to prove that the insured
has been fully compensated. This procedure has been used by other courts and will
result in the most effective implementation
of the equitable principles underlying the

State Farm also claims that if it is not
entitled to the $5,510 payment from
Bryan's insurer, then the releases signed
by Hill and Caldwell cannot act to extinguish its subrogation claim against Bryan.
Allowing plaintiffs to extinguish State
Farm's claims would be tantamount to a
breach of the subrogation provision in the
insurance policy. If, however, the amount
of damages incurred by plaintiffs exceeds
the amount paid by Bryan, then State Farm
must also demonstrate that it could have
recovered the $5,510 from Bryan, absent
the releases and without relying on the
insurance policy proceeds. See, e.g., Royal
Indem. Co. v. Pharr, 94 Ga. App. 114, 117,
93 S.E.2d 784, 786 (1956). As we stated in
Barnes:
The plaintiff [insurer] to establish a superior equity and thus to be entitled to
prevail must present proof which establishes that the damages covered by defendant's settlement were the same or
cover those for which the defendant has
already received indemnity from plaintiff; otherwise, the receipt of payment
from the tort-feasor does not entitle the
plaintiff to the return of the payments
made by it.

2. This is evidenced by Cumis's willingness to
tender the full policy amount prior to litigation

or serious negotiation over the amount of plaintiffs' damages.

In light of these principles and prevailing
Utah law, we hold that in the absence of
specific contractual terms in either the release and settlement or the insurance policy, the insured must be made whole prior
to any recovery by the insurer against the
tort-feasor. Where the insured settles with
the tort-feasor, the settlement amount goes
to the insured unless the insurer can prove
that the insured has already received full
compensation.

Barnes, 29 Utah 2d 101, 106-07, 505 P.2d
783, 787 (citations omitted).
[8] We affirm the trial court's summary judgment in State Farm's claim against
Bryan. State Farm's subrogation claims
cannot rise above the claims of the subrogees, plaintiffs Hill and Caldwell. Because
Hill and Caldwell released Bryan from any
further liability, State Farm is unable to
pursue its claim against him. Instead, as
explained above, State Farm's only recourse is to show either that plaintiffs were
fully compensated and thus State Farm is
entitled to be reimbursed from Bryan's insurance policy proceeds or that plaintiffs'
action in releasing Bryan breached the insurance policy, and if State Farm shows it
could have recovered from Bryan, it will be
entitled to the proceeds as a matter of
equity.
Summary judgment in favor of State
Farm on plaintiffs' complaints and on State
Farm's counterclaim is reversed. Judgment in favor of Bryan is affirmed.
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Glenn C. Hanni #A1327
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendant
600 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-7 080
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT KENT HILL, Individually
and as personal representative
of the heirs of TAMARA ELAINE
HILL, deceased, and LORIN DEAN
CALDWELL, Individually and as
personal representative of the

ORDER

heirs of TROY NEIL CALDWELL,

deceased,
Plaintiffs,
Civil No. C83-8099

vs
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant.

Plaintiffs1 motion for leave to file first amended complaint
together with memoranda in support and in opposition to said
motion were submitted to the court, pursuant to Rule 4-501, Code
of Judicial Administration, for decision.

The court having

reviewed the motion and the memoranda, and being advised in the
premises, now, therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that plaintiffs1
motion for leave to file first amended complaint is denied;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this matter proceed to trial
and/or other disposition with dispatch as the case is now in its
seventh year.
DATED this

7^—day of £sfl.

1990.

BY THE COURT:

Honorabl
District

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Order was mailed, postage prepaid, on January ex J ,
1990, to the following:
Roy A. Jacobson, Jr.
V. Anthony Vehar
Vehar, Beppler, Jacobson, Lavery & Rose
P. O. Box 189
Kemmerer, WY 83101
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Glenn C. Hanni #A1327
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendant
600 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-7080
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT KENT HILL, Individually
and as personal representative
of the heirs of TAMARA ELAINE
HILL, deceased, and LORIN DEAN
CALDWELL, Individually and as
personal representative of the
heirs of TROY NEIL CALDWELL,
deceased,

JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
vs.

Civil No. C83-8099

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY,

Judge David s. Young

Defendant.
Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff Hill
and for partial summary judgment as to plaintiff Caldwell was
heard by the Honorable David S. Young, District Judge, pursuant
to notice, on March 12, 1990. Glenn C. Hanni of the law firm of
Strong & Hanni appeared on behalf of defendant, and V. Anthony
Vehar of the law firm of Vehar, Beppler, Jacobsen, Lavery & Rose,
P.C., and Wallace R. Lauchnor, Esquire, appeared on behalf of
plaintiffs.

The court, having reviewed defendants motion and memoranda,
plaintiffs' memorandum, having considered oral argument, and
being advised in the premises, now, therefore;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, FOUND, AND DECREED as
follows:

1.

The court finds that since the Supreme Court's decision

in Hill v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins, Co. 765 P.2d 864 (Utah
1988), State Farm has paid the $5,510 plus interest to
plaintiffs.

Therefore, the only remaining claims are for bad

faith and punitive damages.
2.

Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff

Hill is granted on the following grounds:
(a) Hill's claim for bad faith against defendant is an
insurance first-party bad faith claim similar to Beck v. Farmers
Insurance Exchange 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985).

Since Hill was not

in privity of contract with defendant there was no duty owed to
him by defendant and he has no cause of action for first-party
insurance bad faith against State Farm;
(b) Hill has no claim to recover punitive damages against
State Farm because he has alleged no independent tortious conduct
against State Farm.

No punitive damages may be awarded for a

claim of first-party insurance bad faith because such claim
constitutes a contract action, not a tort action.
2
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3.

Summary judgment dismissing Hill's complaint against

State Farm should be entered, with prejudice, on the merits, no
cause of action;
4.

state Farm's motion for partial summary judgment as to

Caldwell's claim for punitive damages is granted on the grounds
that Caldwell's complaint against State Farm is for first-party
insurance bad faith, which is a contract claim, and for which no
punitive damages may be awarded absent an allegation of
independent tortious conduct.

Caldwell has failed to allege any

independent tortious conduct against State Farm which would be
the basis for punitive damages;
5.

Partial summary judgment should be entered in favor of

defendant and against plaintiff Caldwell dismissing Caldwell's
claim for punitive damages, with prejudice, on the merits, no
cause of action;
6.

The court further finds that the issues raised by

plaintiffs' claims of first-party bad faith against State Farm
are and have been throughout the pendency of this action fairly
debatable issues.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:

1.

Summary judgment is hereby entered in favor of State

Farm and against plaintiff Hill, and Hill's complaint and all
claims contained therein against State Farm, are dismissed with
3

prejudice, on the merits, no cause of action;
2.

Partial summary judgment is hereby entered in favor of

State Farm and against plaintiff Caldwell as to plaintiff
Caldwell's claims for punitive damages against state Farm, and
said claims for punitive damages are dismissed with prejudice, on
the merits, no cause of action.
DATED this

^yfe^SaY

of March, 1990.
SY THE\COURT:

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Judgment was mailed, postage prepaid, on March

(4-

,

1990, to the following:
Roy A. Jacobson, Jr.
V. Anthony Vehar
Vehar, Beppler, Jacobson, Lavery & Rose
P. O. Box 189
Kemmerer, WY 83101
Wallace R. Lauchnor
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson
50 South Main #700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
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Sixth Floor Boston Building
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT KENT HILL, Individually
and as personal representative
of the heirs of TAMARA ELAINE
HILL, deceased, and LORIN DEAN
CALDWELL, Individually and as
personal representative of the
heirs of TROY NEIL CALDWELL,
deceased,
Plaintiffs,

J U D G M E N T
C i v i l No. C83-8099
J u d g e David S. Young

vs.
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant.

Defendantfs motion for summary judgment with respect to
the remaining claims of plaintiff, Lorin Dean Caldwell, individually
and as personal representative of the heirs of Troy Neil Caldwell,
deceased, was filed in April, 1990, along with a memorandum in
support of that motion.

Plaintiff Caldwell failed to file a

response to defendants motion for summary judgment and memorandum
in support thereof.

Defendant at the time of filing its motion

for summary judgment and memorandum in support thereof filed a
request for oral argument.

Defendant in May, 1990, served and

filed a notice to submit for decision.

The court finds that the
p r> '\ *"» /- «->

issues raised by the claims of bad faith against State Farm by
plaintiff Lorin Dean Caldwell, individually and as personal
representative of the heirs of Troy Neil Caldwell, deceased,
are and have been throughout the pendency of this action fairly
debatable issues.

The court having considered the records and

files of this case including defendant's memorandum in support of
its motion for summary judgment, and being fully advised,
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

For the reasons set forth in defendant's memorandum

in support of its motion for summary judgment, said motion is
hereby granted and judgment is hereby entered in favor of
defendant and against plaintiff, Lorin Dean Caldwell, individually
and as personal representative of the heirs of Troy Neil Caldwell,
deceased, no cause of action.
2.

Defendant's request for oral argument is hereby denied.

Dated this

/ fl^" day of June, 1990.
BY THE COURT:

avid S. Y<5ung, J
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August 9, 1982

Cumis Insurance Company
1805 Redwood Road
Salt Lake City, UT

Gentlemen:
Re:

(Xir Insured:
Our Claim No:
Your Insured:
Your Claim No:
Date of Loss:

Lorin Caldwell
44 394 365
L. Farre11 Bryan
UA-14200
6-6-82

We have received the salvage check on our insured vehicle in the amount of
S190-00, from A-1 National Salvage Yard- There was $160.00 in towing and
storage.
Therefore, our net loss was S5,510.00, including our insured's S100.00
deductible.
As I explained to you before, the Company has agreed to waive our PIP
subrogation claim: but we are not willing to waive the collision subrogation claim and request payment of this loss in the amount of $5,510.00.
Very truly yours.

L. Clark Davis
Field Claim Specialist
LCD:jg
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

OOOOOO
Regular October Term, 1988

November 1, 1988

Robert Kent Hill, individually and
as personal representative of the
heirs of Tamara Elaine Hill,
deceased, and Lorin Dean Caldwell,
individually and as personal
representative of the heirs of
Troy Neil Caldwell, deceased,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Company,
Defendant, Third-Party
Plaintiff-Appellee and
Cross-Appellant.

REMITTITUR
No- 20334 & 20391
District No. C83-8099

/

This cause having been heretofore argued and submitted,
and the Court being sufficiently advised in the premises, it is now
ordered, adjudged and decreed that the judgment of the trial court
herein be, and the same is, reversed in part and affirmed in part.

Issued:

December 1, 1988

Record: 2 Volumes
2 Envelopes
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